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JURISDICTION OP APPELLATE COURT 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment 
entered on January 14, 1993 by the Honorable Michael R. Murphy. 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE 
ANN, §78-2a-3(2)(k) (1993). 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The issues before this Court involve the initial appeal by 
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, VICTOR M. KIMBALL 
and SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT (hereinafter collectively referred to as 
"KIMBALL") and the cross-appeal by FARRELL G. and VICKI A. 
FORSBERG (hereinafter "FORSBERGS"). The issues raised by the 
appeal and cross-appeal are: 
1. Whether the Trial Court's factual finding regarding 
negligent misrepresentation are supported by the evidence. 
2. Whether there is an implied warranty of habitability in 
the state of Utah. 
3. Whether the Trial Court erroneously adopted and applied 
a restrictive interpretation of the scope of the implied warranty 
of habitability. 
4. Whether the Trial Court improperly found that the 
express one-year builders' warranty contained in the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement had been waived. 
The first issue involves the Trial Court's finding of fact. 
The next two issues involve conclusions of law, and the Trial 
1 
Court's factual findings on those issues are not in question on 
this appeal. The final issue involves the Trial Court's legal 
conclusion based on facts that were presented to it, but on which 
the Trial Court did not make specific findings of fact. 
STANDARD OP REVIEW 
The Court should give all defence and reasonable inference 
to all findings of fact made by the trial court following a 
plenary trial. The Court should review for correctness those 
conclusions of law reached by the trial court. Utah State 
Coalition of Senior Citizens v. Utah Power & Light Co., 776 P.2d 
632, 634 (Utah 1989); English v. Kienke, 774 P.2d 1154, 1156 
, ^ ,
 % DETERMINATIVE LAW 
(Utah App. 1989).
 ( N 0 N E ) 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
The only factual findings in issue on appeal relate to the 
finding of negligent misrepresentation. On cross-appeal facts 
concerning the Earnest Money Sales Agreement are reviewed. 
Therefore, only facts relevant to these issues are presented 
here. All other issues on appeal involve conclusions of law. 
1. KIMBALL purchased approximately 20 lots in the 
Benchmark subdivision in 1985, or 1986. (R. 2048) 
2. To help facilitate the sale of the lots, KIMBALL 
decided to build a home on one of the "more difficult lots." (R. 
2051) 
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3. During the construction of the home, dirt from the 
excavation of the footings was moved to the back of the property 
which covered some survey stakes marking the back corners of the 
lot. (R. 2099) 
4. After the survey stakes were covered, but before 
FORSBERGS first saw the home, KIMBALL had poplar trees planted 
between the home and the GMAC building (a business down the hill 
to the west). The trees were planted without regard to the 
actual boundaries of the property. (R. 2101) 
5. Once the home was completed, KIMBALL placed a 
large banner along the back porch, facing west, which read "For 
Sale." (R. 1698) 
6. KIMBALL left a "FACT SHEET" on a counter in the 
home with the intent that prospective buyers would read it. (R. 
2096) 
7. The FACT SHEET contained information regarding 
certain qualities and elements of the home including a statement 
that the yard was "98' x 102', flat backyard with room for a 
pool." (Appendix 1) 
8. A realtor, hired by KIMBALL, had prepared the FACT 
SHEET for use while the realtor listed the home. (R. 2 093) 
9. When the listing contract between the realtor and 
KIMBALL expired, KIMBALL blocked out the name of the real estate 
company and continued to use the same FACT SHEET. In addition to 
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removing the name of the realtor, KIMBALL specifically removed 
the statement at the bottom of the FACT SHEET warning "Reliable 
but not guaranteed information." (R. 2093, 2095) 
10. When FORSBERGS first entered the home, they found 
a stack of fact sheets on the kitchen counter. They picked one 
up and read it as they walked through the home. (R. 1702-03) 
11. Upon reading from the FACT SHEET that the yard was 
98' x 102' with room for a pool, FORSBERGS were impressed that it 
was a spacious backyard. (R. 1710, 1712) 
12. FORSBERGS' next visit to the house was with 
KIMBALL. (R. 1713) 
13. With no survey stakes to mark the back property 
line, FORSBERGS were having difficulty visualizing how big this 
"98' x 102', flat backyard" really was. FORSBERGS asked KIMBALL 
about the size of the yard. In confirming where the back 
boundaries were, KIMBALL assured FORSBERGS that the poplar trees 
were "within the property line." (R. 1718) 
14. Before closing, FORSBERGS and KIMBALL signed an 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement in which KIMBALL gave an express 
"one-year builders' warranty." (Appendix 2 p. 4, para.No. 6) or 
(Earnest Money Sales Agreement p. 4, para.No. 6) 
15. Later, several months after closing, FORSBERGS 
discovered that the poplar trees were not "within the property," 
but were up to fourteen feet beyond the property boundary. (R. 
1804) 
16. After the trial, but before the Trial Court 
rendered its decision, KIMBALL filed a supplemental brief 
outlining their position regarding the "one-year builders' 
warranty11 contained in the Earnest Money Sales Agreement. 
KIMBALL argued that Clause "B" and "O" both operated to make the 
warranty effective beyond the date of closing. (Appendix 3, p. 
6, 7, 10) or (Defendant Spectrum Development Corporation's 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities Regarding Implied Warranty 
of Habitability p. 6, 7, 10) 
17. Based on KIMBALL'S position, the decision rendered 
by the Trial Court, and their own understanding of the Agreement, 
FORSBERGS included a statement in their proposed findings of fact 
that the express builders' warranty was effective beyond the 
closing date. (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Appendix 
4 p. 2, para. 5) 
18. In response to this, well after the Trial Court 
had rendered its decision, KIMBALL filed objections to the 
findings, now claiming that the express warranty did not apply. 
(Defendant Spectrum Development's Objections to Plaintiffs' 
Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law p. 2-3) or 
(Appendix 5, p. 2-3) 
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19. After a hearing regarding the express warranty on 
November 16, 1992, the Trial Court issued a Minute Entry on 
November 24, 1992 that objections to the plaintiffs7 recovery 
under the express builders7 warranty were sustained. The Trial 
Court made no reference to any facts or law presented. (Minute 
Entry of Nov. 24, 1992) or (Appendix 6) 
SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
There is sufficient testimony within the record supporting 
the Trial Court's finding of negligent misrepresentation by 
KIMBALL. It is the special duty of the trier of fact to 
determine which witnesses are credible and which are not. After 
hearing all of the testimony on the issue the trier of fact 
determined that FORSBERGS reasonably relied on KIMBALL'S 
misrepresentation regarding the size of the yard of the home. 
When all of the evidence and testimony supporting this finding is 
marshalled, it is clear that there is adequate foundation for the 
finding of negligent misrepresentation. 
The Trial Court also had ample evidence to calculate the 
damages caused by the negligent misrepresentation. Evidence 
admitted stated both an area map of the false representation of 
the backyard, and the actual dimensions of the backyard. By 
simply subtracting the area of the actual yard from the area that 
was represented the Court derived the area that FORSBERGS were 
told they were getting which they did not get. This area of land 
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has a value assessed by the square foot. Therefore the damages 
are easily calculated. 
In addition, FORSBERGS cross-appeal the Trial Courts 
conclusions of law concerning the theory of implied warranty of 
habitability. Although FORSBERGS agree with the Trial Court that 
there is an implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new 
homes, the Trial Court did not properly apply the doctrine. As a 
matter of law, when a home is not built in a workmanlike manner 
which causes water to actually flow through the basement, snow to 
accumulate in the interior walls, and pipes inside the house to 
freeze and rupture in 26 places, the home is "uninhabitable." 
The Trial Court properly found that because the home was not 
built in a workmanlike manner these problems arose. However, the 
Trial Court improperly applied the law when it concluded that 
KIMBALL did not breach the implied warranty of habitability 
because the defects did not render the home "uninhabitable." 
Because the home was uninhabitable as a matter of law, FORSBERGS 
should be reimbursed the amount of money spent to bring the home 
up to a level of habitability. 
In addition to the implied warranty, there was an express 
builders7 one-year warranty against defects in workmanship. This 
express warranty exists as an express part of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement and is not included in the implied warranty of 
habitability. Even if this Court decides that, as a matter of 
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law, the home was habitable, the Trial Court's findings clearly 
show that the home was not built in a workmanlike manner. 
Because the defects complained of were discovered within the 
first year, they fall within this express warranty. Even KIMBALL 
has argued that this warranty was intended to apply. In 
discounting this express warranty, the Trial Court made no 
findings of fact, nor did it refer to any conclusions of law. 
The Trial Court's decision is not supported by the evidence, is 
contrary to KIMBALL'S own admissions, and is contrary to Utah 
law. Therefore, this ruling should be reversed and the express 
builders' warranty should be held to apply. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING OP NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION IS WELL SUPPORTED BY THE 
EVIDENCE AND SHOULD BE AFFIRMED. 
The Trial Court's findings are not clearly erroneous, but 
are solidly founded in the evidence. The Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure state that "[f]indings of fact, whether based on oral 
or documentary evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly 
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of 
the Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses." Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a). The Utah Supreme Court explained how this is to 
be applied in Gravson Roper LTD. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Utah 
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1989). "To successfully attack a trial court's findings of fact, 
an appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of 
the findings and then demonstrate that the evidence, including 
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to 
support the findings against an attack under the rule 52(a) 
standard." Id. at 470 (emphasis added). 
The Utah Supreme Court gave further instructions on how to 
apply the rule 52(a) standard in Reed v. Reed, 806 P.2d 1182 
(Utah 1991). In Reed the Court stated: 
It is the province of the trier of fact to assess the 
credibility of witnesses, and we will not second-guess the 
trial court where there is a reasonable basis to support its 
findings. In order to challenge the court's findings of 
fact, the defendant must marshal all of the evidence in 
favor of the findings and then demonstrate that even when 
reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
court below, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
findings. Id. at 1184 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added). 
This standard has been summed up in Gillmor v. Wright, 850 
P.2d 431 (Utah 1993) as the "clearly erroneous" standard. The 
Gillmor court stated: 
We review these findings of fact under the clearly 
erroneous standard. Appellants must marshal the 
evidence in support of the findings and then 
demonstrate that despite this evidence, the findings 
are so lacking in support that they are against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus clearly erroneous. 
Id. at 433. 
Therefore, appellants must marshal all the evidence that 
supports, either directly or by inference, the findings of the 
trial court. Appellants must go further than merely showing that 
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testimony exists which is contrary to a trial courts findings. 
This did not happen in the case at bar. In the instant case, 
KIMBALL makes many references to Appellee's testimony on direct 
and cross examination, but omits Appellant's testimony from the 
first day of trial. This crucial testimony is included below. 
KIMBALL claims three factual findings are in error: First, 
whether there was a misrepresentation concerning the size of the 
yard (Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter 
"Findings") p. 5, para. No. 25); Second, whether the FORSBERGS 
reasonably relied on the misrepresentation (Findings p. 5, para. 
No. #26) ; Third, whether the yard size was actually smaller than 
what was represented causing $21,767.90 in damages (Findings 
p. 5, para. No. 27). Additionally, KIMBALL claims that the 
credibility of witnesses is not an issue because the witnesses 
"essentially agreed on the major points." (Brief of Christensen 
& Kimball and Victor M. Kimball p. 25) 
The credibility of the witnesses is critical because 
FORSBERGS and KIMBALL disagree in testimony concerning the one 
pivotal point of the negligent misrepresentation issue. That 
point is whether KIMBALL told FORSBERGS the poplar trees were 
"within" the property. Dr. Forsberg stated that Kimball told him 
the property line was "beyond the trees." (R. 1718) Kimball 
testified that he did not tell Forsberg that the trees were on 
the property. (R. 1163). It is reasonable, therefore, to infer 
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that the court found Forsberg's testimony more credible than 
Kimball's. 
That inference is important as the rest of the evidence is 
analyzed, for it highlights the importance of Kimball's testimony 
from cross examination which was omitted in KIMBALL'S brief. 
First, there was evidence concerning the size of the yard. There 
are two important representations dealing with the size of the 
yard. First, the FACT SHEET which stated that the yard size was 
"98' x 102', flat back yard with room for a pool." (Appendix 
1). Second, KIMBALL gave a verbal representation to FORSBERGS 
regarding the size of the yard. Dr. Forsberg testified on direct 
exam that: 
Question: Did you have some discussion with Mr. Kimball 
about those poplar trees? 
Answer: Yes, I did. 
Question: Tell us what you said and what he said, as best 
you can. 
Answer: Well, I was trying to confirm the boundaries of 
the backyard, and I asked him about the poplar 
trees. And he related to me that the poplar trees 
were a reflection of the backyard, roughly the 
back west boundary of the yard. In further 
pursuing that — 
Question: Go ahead. In further pursuing that, did he 
describe it in any other way? 
Answer: He described that the poplars — because there 
were no landscape markers there, I was concerned 
as to exactly where the back corners and back 
property lines were, and he assured me that the 
poplar trees were within the property of the 
residence for sale. 
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Question: Within the property? 
Answer: Correct. (R. 1718, L. 2-21) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Forsberg continued to give similar 
testimony that he was told that the property line was somewhere 
beyond the trees. (R. 1813-14) 
The FACT SHEET and this testimony are adequate, even 
plentiful to show that the Trial Court properly found that there 
was a representation regarding the exact size of the property. 
KIMBALL has not met its burden of proving the Trial Court's 
finding is "clearly erroneous." The second finding in question 
is whether it was reasonable for FORSBERGS to rely on the 
representations about the yard size. This finding centers on the 
law regarding the duties of each party in a sale of property to 
know the size of the property being sold. In Duaan v. Jones. 615 
P.2d 1239 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court detailed the duties 
of the different parties to the sale of property. A vendor of 
property, the Appellants in the case at bar, has "a special duty 
to know the truth of his representations or where the nature of 
the situation is such the vendor is presumed to know the facts to 
which his representation relates, a misrepresentation is 
fraudulent even though not made knowingly, willfully or with 
actual intent to deceive." Id. at 1246 (emphasis added). 
The Duaan court further explained the right of the purchaser 
to rely on the assertions made by the vendor, stating: 
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In the Restatement, Torts 2nd, Sec. 538A, Comment e, p. 
84, it is stated: 
"Quantity as a fact. A statement of the 
quantity of either land or chattels is a 
statement of fact. A purchaser of either is 
entitled to assume that the vendor knows the 
acreage of the land or the quantity of a lot 
of goods that he is selling. This is true 
although the vendors statement does not 
assert or imply that it is based upon a 
survey of the land or a measurement, weighing 
or count of the goods.11 
Furthermore, a vendee of real property, in the absence 
of facts putting him on notice, has no duty to 
investigate to determine whether the vendor has 
misrepresented the area conveyed. Neither is a vendee 
estopped from recovering for misrepresentation of the 
area of the land conveyed merely because he viewed or 
inspected the premises, so long as he did not endeavor 
to determine independently the exact quantity of land. 
Nor is a vendee estopped from recovering in an action 
for deceit because he had the opportunity to inspect or 
otherwise check the property prior to purchase. Id. at 
1246-47 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). 
This case shows that a builder, or vendor, has a duty to know 
whether his representations are truthful. This means the vendor 
has the duty to investigate to learn the truth of his 
representations. This case also shows that a buyer has the right 
to assume that the vendor has been truthful in his 
representations, unless there are facts which should put the 
buyer on notice. The fact that vendor does not do his duty to 
investigate is not sufficient to put a buyer on notice, or this 
simple omission would completely destroy the rule. 
In the instant case, KIMBALL made a specific representation 
in the FACT SHEET regarding the size of the yard. Additionally, 
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KIMBALL removed the one statement from the FACT SHEET that may 
have actually put FORSBERGS on notice• KIMBALL testified: 
Question: And you took this fact sheet and blocked out or 
whited out or covered up the Ramsey Group name at 
the bottom and put in your brothers name at the 
bottom; correct? 
Answer: Yes. We removed a statement at the bottom, along 
with their name, that said, "Reliable but not 
guaranteed information," along with their name. 
Question: Sorry? 
Answer: Apparently at the bottom, from what I have been 
told, is that there was a statement that said, 
"This information is reliable but not guaranteed", 
and then the Ramsey Group. [question] Who told 
you that? 
Answer: Linda Wolcott told me that. 
Question: But you covered that up and put your name and Dave 
Kimball? 
Answer: Yes. (R. 2095, L. 12-25; R. 2096, L. 1-2) 
Furthermore, this FACT SHEET was titled "FACT SHEET," not 
"General Information Sheet" or some other title. The title 
itself conveys an assurance that what is in the sheet is true. 
There is no notice within the title to alert FORSBERGS that the 
information is false or just a guess, just the opposite is true! 
It is reasonable for the Trial Court to infer from this that 
FORSBERGS were not on notice, and, therefore, had no duty to 
investigate further. 
Additionally, the Dugan court puts a duty on the seller to 
know the size of his property. In the instant case, KIMBALL is a 
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licensed real estate broker. (R. 1200) He is experienced in the 
business of selling and developing homes. However, he failed in 
this duty to know the boundaries as shown by his direct 
examination: 
Question: At any time during the time that you were 
attempting to sell this home, Mr. Kimball,did you 
know where the specific corners of the lot were? 
Answer: I did not know where the back corners of this lot 
were. I believe in the front of the house there 
were nails driven into the sidewalk or into the 
gutter denoting the front line. (R. 1161, L. 17-
23) 
Furthermore, it was KIMBALL7s desire that FORSBERGS rely on 
the information in the FACT SHEET. KIMBALL Appellants used the 
FACT SHEET with its reference to the size of the backyard for the 
express purpose of conveying information to prospective buyers 
when he was not at the home. In KIMBALL'S own testimony during 
cross examination we learn: 
Question: (By Mr. Hintze) What was the purpose of that fact 
sheet, Mr. Kimball? 
Answer: To give general information as to the home. 
Question: Did you intend that prospective buyers would look 
at this fact sheet? 
Answer: Yes. 
Question: And it was so disseminated for that purpose; 
right? 
Answer: Yes. (R. 2095, L. 1-3; R. 2096, L. 16-21) 
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This is exactly what happened. When FORSBERGS first entered 
the home they picked up a FACT SHEET and read it, as shown by 
Appellee Dr. Forsberg's testimony: 
Question: Okay. What transpired? 
Answer: We gained entry through the front door and walked 
through the house. 
Question: And let me ask you first of all, did you obtain a 
copy of a document called the fact sheet? 
Answer: Yes. We did. 
• • • 
Question: Did you read it? Did you personally read it as 
you went through that walk-through? 
Answer: Yes, we did. (R. 1702, L. 1-6, 25; R. 1703, L. 1-
2). 
Although there was nothing on the FACT SHEET to indicate to 
FORSBERGS that it contained false information, they did 
investigate further. When they were in the home with KIMBALL, 
they questioned him about the size of the backyard. Appellee Dr. 
Forsberg testified that "I was concerned as to exactly where the 
back corners and back property lines were, and he [Victor 
Kimball] assured me that the poplar trees were within the 
property of the residence for sale." (R. 1718). FORSBERGS had 
no reason to doubt Mr. Kimball, or question whether he had told 
them the truth. 
FORSBERGS had read the FACT SHEET as to the size of the 
yard, but were not sure just how big that was. Upon questioning 
1A 
Appellant, whom they rightfully presumed would know, they were 
given false information upon which they relied. FORSBERGS did 
not ask KIMBALL "How far is 98 feet from here?" They did not 
have to. FORSBERGS presumed that KIMBALL knew what was on the 
FACT SHEET as well as they did. Therefore, they asked for some 
type of visual reference point. KIMBALL gave them that reference 
point, indicating a row of poplar trees he had planted. Once the 
reference point was given, FORSBERGS presumed that KIMBALL was 
correct. 
KIMBALL erroneously argues that FORSBERGS were on notice and 
had a duty to investigate further. However, the pnly fact that 
KIMBALL uses to support this claim is that it was clear that 
KIMBALL did not know how big the backyard was, or the location of 
the back boundary. Since KIMBALL had the duty to investigate and 
learn the truth of his representation, the Trial Court properly 
found that this was not sufficient notice to shift the duty to 
investigate to FORSBERGS. Any other conclusion would defeat the 
finding of Dugan that the vendor has a "special duty to know the 
truth of his representation." 
The final part of the Trial Court's finding of negligent 
misrepresentation called into question is the issue of proper 
damages. The Dugan Court set out in clear and plain language the 
proper measure of damages stating "[t]he proper measure of 
damages in an action for fraud and deceit is the difference 
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between the value of the property purchased and the value it 
would have had if the representations were true, viz., the 
benefit of the bargain rule." Dugan, 615 P.2d at 1247. 
This is the very formula that the Trial Court used. The 
backyard was represented as "98' x 102'" which calculates to 
9,996 square feet. FORSBERGS did not receive a backyard that was 
98' x 102'. Appellant Victor Kimball testified that the yard was 
not that large: 
Question: Right. Now, is the back yard of this house 98 by 
one hundred two? 
Answer: The back yard itself? 
Question: Yes. 
Answer: No, it's not. It's 98 from the front to the back 
on each of the — 
Question: I understand what you're — just respond to my 
question. Just respond to the question I ask. I 
understood that the entire dimensions of the — I 
understood that's the entire dimensions of the 
lot. But this doesn't say it's describing the 
lot, does it? 
Answer: No. It says "Yard Size". (R. 2098, L. 14-25) 
On cross-examination, Dr. Forsberg similarly testified: 
Question: You have testified earlier that the yard as 
presented by Mr. Vic Kimball had something to do 
with these poplar trees, I guess; is that correct? 
Answer: That's correct. 
Question: And how far beyond the actual property line were 
those poplar trees? 
Answer: They were — the representations of my 
measurements there on this poster, and they vary 
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from anywhere from three to four feet on the 
northeast to approximately fourteen to fifteen 
feet. 
Quest-ion: And fourteen to fifteen feet here in the center? 
Answer: Correct. (R. 1804, L. 3-15) 
Later, after the backyard was surveyed, Dr. Forsberg measured the 
size of his backyard. This measurement was roughly drawn to 
scale on a diagram that the Trial Court accepted as Exhibit P-34. 
(R. 1721-22). From these measurements, FORSBERGS calculated that 
the back yard was actually only 4,342 square feet. If the 
representation of the FACT SHEET had been true, FORSBERGS would 
have received another 5,654 square feet of property. At the time 
of the sale, the property was valued at $3.85 per square foot. 
Damages of $21,767.90 is calculated by multiplying 5,368 square 
feet by $3.85 per square foot. 
As this Court reviews this evidence, and applies the 
"clearly erroneous" standard as set forth, it must affirm the 
Trial Court,s finding of negligent misrepresentation. None of 
the Trial Court's findings "are so lacking in support that they 
are against the clear weight of the evidence." Rather, each 
finding is well supported by the evidence, and reasonable 
inferences drawn therefrom. 
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II. 
AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY IS 
GROUNDED IN SOUND PUBLIC POLICY AND SHOULD BE 
ADOPTED BY THE UTAH COURTS. 
Utah should join with its sister states and adopt the 
warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes. Utah is one 
of the few states which has not addressed the issue and adopted 
the warranty. (Cf. Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 1991); P.H. 
Inv. v. Oliver, 818 P.2d 1018 (Utah 1991).) Recently the Nevada 
Supreme Court adopted the warranty in Radaker v. Scott. 855 P.2d 
1037 (Nev. 1993). Commenting on the prevalence of the warranty, 
it stated "At least thirty-eight of the forty-one states which 
have addressed the issue of whether a builder/vendor impliedly 
warrants habitability have ruled in favor of the warranty. Of 
the thirty-eight states embracing the warranty, only Maryland has 
done so through the legislative process." Id. at 1042. 
A quick review of the reasoning of several of the courts 
which have adopted the warranty reveals a natural conclusion to 
adopt the warranty. Nevada discovered this stating "We agree 
with the virtual consensus among courts in our sister states that 
the implied warranty of habitability reflects a naturally 
expected and sound public policy. We accordingly recognize and 
adopt the warranty in this jurisdiction." Id. At least thirty-
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nine states have now adopted the warranty including Nevada supra, 
Idaho1, Montana2, Wyoming3, Colorado4, Arizona5, and California6, 
A. A warranty of implied habitabilitv is needed to protect 
the public 
One of the main purposes of the warranty, as shown by its 
history, is to put liability on the person who has the most 
expertise and ability to make certain of the quality. The 
history of the warranty has been stated by many courts. The 
Illinois Supreme Court summed it up in Redarowicz v. Ohlendorf, 
441 N.E.2d 324, 328 (111. 1982): 
The implied warranty of habitability was first 
recognized in the English case of Miller v. Cannon Hill 
Estates, Ltd. (1931), 2 K.B. 113. The court said that 
in the purchase of an unfinished house the builder was 
aware that his buyer intended to live in the house and 
therefore impliedly warranted that it would be suitable 
for that purpose. (2 K.B. 113.) In 1957 an Ohio court 
in Vanderschrier v. Aaron (1957), 103 Ohio App. 340, 
140 N.E.2d 819, applied the Miller rule for the first 
time in the United States. In 1964 the Colorado 
Supreme Court extended the implied warranty to a 
completed house. Carpenter v. Donohoe (1964), 154 
Colo. 78, 388 P.2d 399. 
!Bethlahmv v. Bechtel. 415 P.2d 698 (Idaho 1966). 
2Chandler v. Madsen. 642 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1982). 
3Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975). 
4Carpenter v. Donohoe, 388 P.2d 399 (Colo. 1961). 
5Richards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427 (Ariz. 
1984). 
6Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles Development Co., 525 P.2d 88 (Cal. 
1974). 
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Many cases also refer to the demise of the doctrine of 
caveat emptor as applied to the sale of new homes in explaining 
why the implied warranty should be effective. This was 
summarized in Chandler v. Madsen, 642 P.2d 1028 (Mont. 1981). 
There the Montana Supreme Court stated: 
Caveat emptor, which traditionally has applied to sales 
of real estate, developed at a time when a buyer and 
seller were in equal bargaining positions. They were 
of comparable skill and knowledge and each could 
protect himself in a transaction. 
In the modern marketplace that equality of 
position no longer necessarily exists, and a growing 
number of jurisdictions have abandoned caveat emptor in 
favor of implied warranties where a builder-vendor 
sells a new residence. [Citations] 
The doctrine of caveat emptor no longer serves the 
realities of the marketplace. Therefore we hold that 
the builder-vendor of a new home impliedly warrants 
that the residence is constructed in a workmanlike 
manner and is suitable for habitation. Id. at 1031 
(citations omitted). 
The Utah Supreme Court has already acknowledged this demise of 
caveat emptor. stating "[i]n this state, it is apparent that the 
rule of caveat emptor does not apply to those dealing with a 
licensed real estate agent." Duaan v. Jones. 615 P.2d 1239, 1248 
(Utah 1980). From Dugan, it is a small step for Utah to reach an 
implied warranty of habitability in the sale of new homes. 
Courts have taken this changed view for good reason, it is 
good public policy. As the Illinois court explained: 
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The warranty of habitability is a creature of public 
policy. It is a judicial innovation that has evolved 
to protect purchasers of new houses upon discovery of 
latent defects in their homes. While the warranty of 
habitability has roots in the execution of the contract 
for sale, we emphasize that it exists independently. 
Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 330 (citations omitted). 
In Tavares v. Horstman, 542 P.2d 1275 (Wyo. 1975), the Wyoming 
Supreme Court gave the reason at the core of this public policy. 
The Tavares court stated: 
Building construction by modern methods is complex and 
intertwined with governmental codes and regulations. 
The ordinary home buyer is not in a position, by skill 
or training, to discover defects lurking in the 
plumbing, the electrical wiring, the structure itself, 
all of which is usually covered up and not open for 
inspection. 
A home buyer should be able to place reliance on the 
builder or developer who sells him a new house. The 
improved real estate the average family buys gives it 
thoughtful pause not only because of the base price but 
the interest involved over a long period of time. This 
is usually the largest single purchase a family makes 
for a lifetime. Id. at 1279 (emphasis added). 
In other words, this warranty is based on the relationship 
between the builder and the buyer of the home. 
The Colorado Supreme Court realized this in Sloat v. 
Matheny, 625 P.2d 1031, 1033 (Colo. 1981) (emphasis added) 
stating "[t]he position of the builder-vendor, as compared to the 
buyer, dictates that the builder bear the risk that the house is 
fit for its intended use." 
The Colorado Court continued: 
These implied warranties are also consistent with the 
expectations of the parties. "Clearly every builder-
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vendor holds himself out, expressly or impliedly, as 
having the expertise necessary to construct a livable 
dwelling. It is equally as obvious that almost every 
buyer acts upon these representations and expects that 
the new house he is buying, whether already constructed 
or not yet built, will be suitable for use as a home. 
Otherwise there would be no sale." McDonald v. 
Mianecki, supra. See also Pollard v. Saxe & Yolles 
Develop. Co.. 12 Cal.3d 374, 525 P.2d 88, 115 Cal.Rptr. 
648 (1974); Duncan v. Schuster Graham Homes, Inc., 
supra: Petersen v. Hubschman Const. Co., Inc., supra. 
Another rationale for the rule is to "inhibit the 
unscrupulous, fly-by-night, or unskilled builder and to 
discourage much of the sloppy work and jerry building 
that has become perceptible over the years." Capra v. 
Smith, 372 So.2d 321, 323 (Ala. 1979) (Id.) 
Other courts have agreed. "The court reasoned that the skill and 
integrity of the builder-vendor is relied upon by the purchaser 
who is not capable of making a meaningful inspection of the 
house." Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 329. The Illinois court 
further declared "[i]f construction of a new house is defective, 
its repair costs should be borne by the responsible builder-
vendor who created the latent defect." Id. at 3 30. 
Arizona added "[t]he guiding principle of Richards v. 
Powercraft is that innocent purchasers should be protected and 
builders held accountable for their work." Nastri v. Wood Bros. 
Homes, Inc., 690 P.2d 158, 161 (Ariz.App. 1984) (emphasis added). 
The Montana Supreme Court stated: 
The concept here is not one of fault or wrong-doing 
but, rather, where one of two innocent parties will 
suffer, which was in the better position to prevent the 
harm? 
Whether or not there was reason for Madsen to 
suspect the problem, as the builder-vendor he clearly 
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was in the better position to prevent the problem. 
Chandler, 642 P.2d at 1032. 
A review of these cases reveals several key factors to this 
public policy of impliedly warranting habitability. First, 
habitability is the basis of the bargain between the builder-
vendor and the buyer. Second, the builder-vendor is in a 
superior position over the buyer in technical knowledge as well 
as knowledge of the defects. Third, the builder-vendor is in the 
best position to prevent the defects through proper workmanship. 
Fourth, the builder-vendor is in the best position to bear the 
risk that the home is fit. Fifth, it is necessary to protect 
buyers from unscrupulous builder-vendors. 
Now, more than ever, Utah needs to acknowledge the warranty 
of habitability. Although this is a policy good for all times, 
there is a particular vulnerability among buyers at this time. 
New homes are being sold nearly as fast as they are built. This 
leaves the door open for the "fly-by-night" and other 
unscrupulous builder-vendors to take advantage of buyers. The 
average buyer does not have the technical skill and knowledge of 
the average builder-vendor. Without the implied warranty of 
habitability there is no route of recovery, or method of 
protection for the buyer. This Court should adopt the implied 
warranty of habitability doctrine in the sale of new homes. 
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B. This Court should adopt a broader view of the scope of 
the implied warranty of habitability than that 
acknowledged by the Trial Court. 
Only a view broader than mere "livability" encompasses all 
of the public policy concerns that are at the heart of the 
implied warranty of habitability. Determining the scope of the 
warranty is a legal conclusion. "When reviewing the district 
court's conclusions of law, we give no deference to the court but 
review those conclusions for correctness." Reed, 806 P.2d at 
1184-85. Therefore, this Court is not bound by the Trial Court's 
narrow and restrictive view in interpreting the implied warranty 
of habitability, but should apply the view that best fits the 
policy reasons for adopting the warranty. 
The scope of the warranty is directly tied to the meaning of 
the term "habitability." Some courts have viewed this to mean 
that if it is at all possible to live in the structure, it is 
habitable. However, other courts give a broader interpretation. 
Illinois has done this, stating "[i]n defining the scope of the 
warranty the court found that the house must be reasonably suited 
for its intended use and not simply inhabitable." Redarowicz. 
441 N.E.2d at 329 (emphasis added). Before reaching its own 
conclusion regarding the scope of the warranty, an Arizona court 
explained how Illinois rejected a narrow interpretation of 
"habitable," stating: 
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The first, Goggin v. Fox Valley Construction Corp. , 48 
Ill.App.3d 103, 38 111.Dec. 271, 365 N.E.2d 509 (1977) 
contains the following holding: 
The primary function of a new home is to 
shelter its inhabitants from the elements. 
If a new home does not keep out the elements 
because of a substantial defect of 
construction, such a home is not habitable 
within the meaning of the implied warranty of 
habitability. . . . 
We do not agree with this strict standard and neither 
does the Supreme Court of Illinois. That court 
expressed its disagreement in Petersen v. Hubschman 
Construction Co.. supra. 
. . . The mere fact that the house is capable 
of being inhabited does not satisfy the 
implied warranty. The use of the term 
"habitability" is perhaps unfortunate. 
Because of its imprecise meaning it is 
susceptible of misconstruction. It would 
more accurately convey the meaning of the 
warranty as used in this context if it were 
to be phrased in language similar to that 
used in the Uniform Commercial Code, warranty 
of merchantability, or warranty of fitness 
for a particular purpose. 389 N.E.2d at 
1158. Nastri v. Wood Bros. Homes. Inc.. 690 
P.2d 158, 162-3 (Ariz.App. 1984) (emphasis 
added). 
The Arizona court concluded that the warranty is one "of 
workmanship and habitability. We believe that to be the law in 
our state, i.e., that there is no distinction except insofar as 
the extent of the damage arising from latent defects may be 
greater if the home has actually become unlivable." Id. at 163, 
The Colorado Appellate Court took the same view in Roper v. 
Spring Lake Development Co.. 789 P.2d 483 (Colo.App. 1990), 
After reviewing several cases it stated: 
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These cases strongly indicate that prior case law did 
not require the buyer to prove both that the house was 
not built in a workmanlike manner and that it was 
unsuitable for habitation. Thus, a buyer is entitled 
to relief based on the theory of implied warranty of 
habitability if he proves the house was not built in a 
workmanlike manner or that it was not suitable for 
habitation. Id. at 485 (emphasis added). 
The Roper court then listed examples of when the warranty was 
breached for different types of defects in the home, stating: 
Courts in other jurisdictions have extended implied 
warranty of habitability to situations in which the 
house is defective or unhabitable for reasons other 
than the workmanship in constructing the house. See 
McDonald v. Mianecki. 79 N.J. 275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979) 
(well water not potable and bad odor present); 
Jeanguneat v. Jackie Hames Construction Co., 576 P.2d 
761 (Okla. 1978) (bad well water); Bethlahmv v. 
Bechtel, 91 Idaho 55, 415 P.2d 698 (1966) (basement 
flooded periodically and offensive odor forced 
inhabitants to move out); Park v. Sohn, 89 111.2d 453, 
60 111.Dec. 609, 433 N.E.2d 651 (1982) (water puddles 
formed in crawl space causing odors); Kirk v. Ridgwav, 
373 N.W.2d 491 (Iowa 1985) (peeling paint on exterior 
of house); Waggoner v. Midwestern Development, Inc.. 83 
S.D. 57, 154 N.W.2d 803 (1967) (high water table caused 
water to seep into basement); Hoye v. Century Builders, 
52 Wash.2d 830, 329 P.2d 474 (1958) (continual 
discharge of raw sewage); Pickler v. Fisher, 7 Ark.App. 
125, 644 S.W.2d 644 (1983). Id. (emphasis added). 
In Deisch v. Jav (790 P.2d 1273, 1276 (Wyo. 1990)) the 
Wyoming Supreme Court also found that the home buyer may prevail 
by showing either poor workmanship or uninhabitability, stating 
"the implied warranty rule accommodates either a recovery of 
money damages for minor defects susceptible of remedy or 
rescission and restitution for major defects which render the 
house unfit for habitation and which are not readily remediable." 
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The Arizona Court of Appeals summed up this theory in one 
sentence, stating "it would be the height of cynicism to allow a 
shoddy builder to escape liability because his work was not 
shoddy enough." Nastri, 690 P.2d at 163. 
This broader view is not unreasonable, nor does it unduly 
tax the ability of the builder-vendor. Perfection is not the 
standard. The Arizona court explained "The test for breach of 
that warranty is reasonableness, not perfection; the standard 
being, ordinarily, the quality of work that would be done by a 
worker of average skill and intelligence." Id. Simply stated, a 
worker of average skill and intelligence builds a home in a 
workmanlike manner. If facts of an individual case show that the 
home was not built in a workmanlike manner, then the worker of 
average skill and intelligence has breached the implied warranty 
of habitability. 
It took several years for the Illinois' court to reach this 
view. Other courts like Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming, as shown 
above, saw the strength of the broader view quicker because of 
the example of Illinois' experience. Similarly, this Court 
should not require Utah home-buyers to go through years of trials 
to establish that the scope of the warranty should be more than 
mere livability. It is plain that the policy reasons behind the 
warranty cannot be fully achieved unless this Court applies a 
broader standard than did the Trial Court. The implied warranty 
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of habitability was meant to protect against a broader range of 
defects due to poor workmanship than simply whether the person is 
driven from their home, or the home completely collapses. This 
Court should set forth this broader, proper interpretation of the 
implied warranty of habitability which encompasses the full power 
of the policy reasons creating it. 
Under the theories described above, KIMBALL has breached the 
implied warranty of habitability. The Trial Court specifically 
found that FORSBERGS' home was not built in a workmanlike manner: 
9. This flooding was the result of the Home not 
being built in a workmanlike manner sufficient to keep 
it watertight. (R. ) 
13. The burst water pipes were cause by a lack of 
workmanlike construction. (R. ) 
21. The painting of the exterior decks and 
railings was not done in a workmanlike fashion. 
(R. ) 
This factual conclusion is not in dispute, the home was not built 
in a workmanlike manner. 
This Court should adopt the view as stated in Roper above 
"a buyer is entitled to relief based on the theory of implied 
warranty of habitability if he proves the house was not built in 
a workmanlike manner . . .." That is, if the Trial Court finds 
that the house was not built in a workmanlike manner, it must 
find for the buyer as a matter of law. Therefore, as a matter of 
law, KIMBALL breached the warranty of habitability. 
The Trial Court's conclusion that the implied warranty of 
habitability does not apply should be reversed, and FORSBERGS 
should be awarded damages incurred due to the poor workmanship. 
The damages stemming from the flooding, burst water pipes, and 
poor painting are set forth in the record: 
1. The damages flowing from the failure to build 
the home in a workmanlike manner sufficient to keep it 
watertight are reflected in Exhibits 71 through 73 and 
Exhibit 64, plus a total of $450 attributable to time 
spent by the Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg, for a total of 
$10,591.21. All these costs are reasonable and were 
reasonably incurred. 
2. With respect to the frozen and burst pipes 
caused by a lack of workmanlike construction, but for 
the insurance, Plaintiffs would have suffered damages 
as reflected in Exhibits P-46 through P-52, 57-62, and 
66-70, totaling $5,169.92, all of which were reasonable 
in amount. 
4. With respect to the flaking paint on the 
railings and the decks, this was not a latent defect. 
Nevertheless, for the eventuality of the Defendant 
being found liable for the painting defects, the cost 
to repair is reflected in Exhibit 44 and is the sum of 
$3,049.00 which the court finds reasonable and 
necessary. 
The total of damages caused by the defects is $18,810.13. In 
other words, FORSBERGS had to spend an additional $18,810.13 in 
order to bring their home up to the level of a workmanlike 
product. KIMBALL promised, through the implied warranty of 
habitability, that they were selling a home built in a 
workmanlike manner, but they did not sell such a home. It will 
be a windfall to KIMBALL if they are not held responsible for 
their shoddy work. 
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This Court should give no deference to the Trial Court's 
conclusion of law, and reverse the finding that the implied 
warranty of habitability is limited to defects causing the home 
to be unlivable. This Court should follow courts such as 
Illinois, Arizona, Colorado, and Wyoming in interpreting the 
scope of the warranty to include defects caused when the home is 
not built in a workmanlike manner. In doing so, this Court will 
give the full meaning to the public policy on which the warranty 
is centered. 
III. 
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONCLUDED THAT 
F0RSBER6S WAIVED THE EXPRESS BUILDE*VS 
WARRANTY AND SHOULD BE OVERTURNED. 
The Trial Court disregarded claims and admissions of both 
parties in finding a waiver of the express builders' warranty. 
This finding of the court is contrary to reasoned Utah law, and 
goes against the intent of both KIMBALL and FORSBERGS. "It is 
well settled that /[c]ontracts are to be construed in light of 
the reasonable expectations of the parties as evidenced by the 
purpose and language of the contract.' Nixon and Nixon, Inc. v. 
John New & Assocs., 641 P.2d 144,146 (Utah 1982)" HCA Health 
Serv. v. St. Mark's Charities, 846 P.2d 476 (Utah App. 1993). 
"The intent of the parties at the time they entered into the 
agreement controls the meaning of the written contract." 
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Founders Bank and Trust Co, v. Upsher, 830 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Okl. 
1992) . 
In the case at hand, the Trial Court attempts to rewrite the 
contract between FORSBERGS and KIMBALL to exclude the one-year 
builder's warranty on workmanship. This goes against the intent 
of both parties, both as expressed in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement, and as expressed through the course of the trial. The 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement was accepted as Plaintiffs exhibit 
no. 28. These relevant sections are as follows: 
B. INSPECTION . . . Buyer accepts the property in "as-
is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as 
outlined in Section 6. 
O. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in 
this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing 
documents shall abrogate this Agreement. 
6. SELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties 
contained in Section C, the following items are also 
warranted: Seller to give a 1 year builders warranty 
on the entire home. (Appendix 2, p. 1, 4, 5) 
There is no dispute between the parties that Sections B and 
0 of the agreement were to preserve both section C and section 6 
beyond closing. KIMBALL very carefully set out its position in 
this regard in a supplemental brief to the Trial Court after the 
trial was concluded. 
After the trial, but before rendering its decision, the 
Trial Court requested some additional information on the implied 
warranty of habitability. KIMBALL filed a supplemental brief to 
the Trial Court to better set forth their position on this issue 
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(attached hereto as Appendix 3). In this final word to the 
Court, KIMBALL explained their view of the applicability of 
section B of the Earnest Money Agreement, and how it related to 
the one-year builder's warranty, stating "the Plaintiffs 
[FORSBERGS] specifically negotiated a one-year builder's warranty 
on the entire home. By the very terms of Section 0 of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, this and any other express 
warranties survived the execution and delivery of final closing 
documents." (Appendix 3, p. 6)(emphasis added) "Plaintiffs 
included an express one-year builders' warranty in their offer, 
which was accented by the Seller." (Appendix 3, p. 7)(emphasis 
added) "F. Plaintiffs, with the exception of the one-year 
builders' warranty and the warranties set forth in Section C of 
the Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Ex. 28), expressly accepted 
the property 'as is.'" (Appendix 3, p. 10)(emphasis added). 
FORSBERGS agree with this position that the one-year 
builders' warranty was accepted by KIMBALL and was effective 
beyond the closing date. There is no dispute and no ambiguity. 
The Trial Court has no authority to sua sponte evaluate the 
agreement and impose its own interpretation. A case that stands 
for this is Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 
1028 (Utah 1985). Both parties meant what they have said. There 
is no waiver of the builders' warranty. The Trial Court erred 
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when it interpreted the agreement to waive the builders' warranty 
and should be reversed. 
Because there is no waiver of the warranty, the warranty 
applies to all damages incurred by FORSBERGS. All defects 
complained of were discovered within the one year time limit on 
the express warranty, and were found to be due to poor 
workmanship. As noted above, the damages stemming from the 
frozen pipes, flooding basement, and poor painting is $18,810.13. 
These damages were all found by the Trial Court to be reasonable. 
FORSBERGS should be awarded this sum under the one-year builders7 
warranty. 
One further point on this issue is the Trial Court's finding 
regarding paragraph three of the supplemental findings. This is 
not based on applicable law, and should be reversed. The fact 
that FORSBERGS paid for the repairs to the frozen pipes, and the 
rooms, with money received from an insurance company does not 
take away KIMBALL'S liability. 
FORSBERGS bargained for a home that was built in a 
workmanlike manner. KIMBALL warranted the home to be built in a 
workmanlike manner. Because the home was not built in a 
workmanlike manner, KIMBALL received more money than the home was 
worth. If KIMBALL is not held liable for the defect, KIMBALL 
will receive a windfall of $18,810.13 
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Although the court made proper findings of law, based on the 
evidence before it, that the home was not built in a workmanlike 
manner, it did not properly apply the law. The Trial Court 
should not have altered the Earnest Money Sales Agreement entered 
by the parties but should have let it stand as intended. As 
intended, KIMBALL breached the express builders' warranty and 
should pay the $18,810.13 in damages caused by the breach. 
CONCLUSION 
KIMBALLS have not met their burden of showing that the Trial 
Court's findings are "clearly erroneous." The Trial Court had 
sufficient evidence on each point concerning the negligent 
misrepresentation to reach its conclusions. When the evidence is 
reviewed, and proper inferences taken, it is clear that the Trial 
Court reached a supportable position. The damage award based on 
negligent misrepresentation should stand as awarded by the Trial 
Court. 
On the other hand, the Trial Court did make two rulings in 
law that should be reversed. Although the Trial Court properly 
found that there does exist, as a matter of public policy, an 
implied warranty of inhabitability, it improperly applied a 
narrow and restrictive view of the scope of "habitable." This 
Court should adopt the warranty as applicable when the buyer of 
new home can prove the builders work was not in a workmanlike 
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manner. Applied to the instant case, FORSBERGS should be awarded 
$18,810.13, the amount associated with the defects of poor 
workmanship. 
Furthermore, the Trial Court improperly re-wrote the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement, changing it against the intent and 
understanding of both parties. The Trial Court's conclusion that 
the express one-year builders' warranty was waived must therefore 
be reversed. This is an alternate theory by which FORSBERGS can 
recover for the poor workmanship. If this Court finds that the 
implied warranty of habitability does not apply in this case, the 
damages of $18,810.13 should be awarded under the express 
builders' warranty. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of January, 1994. 
HAROLD A. HINTZE * 
Attorney for FORSBERGS 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies 
of the foregoing BRIEF to be mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
DUANE R. SMITH (A-2996) 
310 South Main Street 
Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for KIMBALLS 
Dennis R. James 
Mitchell T. Rice 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, 8th Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Attorney for Spectrum Development 
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%*.«-* Trfi; J K n . t i h / i W «Mfc*t*i9 
236n South Sc jn ic Drive (2745 East) 
3 2-^,605.00 ^ 
PANORAMIC VIEWS from almost every room in this new home in Benchmark. 
Be the first owner of these gorgeous hardwood floors, customized kitchen 
with adjoining family room, and all that is included in this exciting 
three-level contemporary design. Vaulted ceilings, light, bright and 
spacious as designed by architect David Rohovit. Some of the details include: 
Price: 
Construction: 
Reduced to $260,000.00 










Customized three-level contemporary. 
Gorgeous entry into living room with fireplace, 
formal dining, kitchen/family room, office or 
library with fabulous three-quarter bath. 
Master suite and bath with Jacuzzi tub, separate 
shower, and double sinks. Two additional bed-
rooms and full bath, large laundry room with 
sink, and cozy family room with fireplace. Room 
under garage could be a terrific exercise area. 
An additional 1,072 square feet of unfinished 
space allowing for family expansion or game 
rooms, storage, etc. Walk-out to level back 
yard area. 
Main: 1,590 1st Level: 1,500 2nd Level: 1,072 
3,090 Finished Square Feet 
95f x 102*, fiat back yard with room for a pool. 
Two-car and parking pad. 
Beacon Heights Elementary 
Hillside Junior High 
Highland High 
Imagine having dinner en this beautiful deck overlooking the valley! The 
quality of this home speaks for itself. 
tA\: V, VL.\>~\V^OA\ 
to. -n i 
- PLAINTIFFS 
. EXHIBIT 
* <* ' * * * • £ - -s^*~ 
Legend Yes (X) No (O) 





t£r GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless excluded herein, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the following items if presently attached to the property, plumbing, heating, 
onditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, win-
and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door opener and transmit-
>), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated, Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by reason 
iy representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to "its condition, size, location, present value, future value, income herefrom or as 
i production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires any additional inspection, 
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that (a) Seller has received no claim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which has not 
ill not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances of any nature shall 
irought current on or before closing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances shall be sound or in 
(factory working condition at closing. 
CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has, to the best of Seller's knowledge, provided an adquate supply of water and 
inued use of the well or wells is authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seller warrants that any septic tank serving the property is, to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and Seller 
no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and construction standards. 
ACCELERATION CLAUSE. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer written verification as ta whether or not any notes, mortgages, 
Js of trust or real estate contracts against the property require the consent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise 
interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the event of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally 
•ove the sale, Buyer shall have the option to declare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice to Seller or Seller's agent prior to closing. In such case, 
arnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions for said "Due on Sale" clause are set forth 
action 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
. TITLE INSPECTION. Not less than five (5) days prior to closing. Seller shall provide to Buyer either an abstract of title brought current with an attorney's opinion 
preliminary title report on the subject property. Prior to closing, Buyer shall give written notice to Seller or Seller's agent, specifying reasonable objections to title, 
reafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at closing, to cure the defect(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agree-
I at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the option of the Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
> TITLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a policy of title insurance to be issued 
uch title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other than those provided for in said standard form, and 
incumbrances or defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable through an escrow agreement at closing, the earnest money 
I, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreement shall thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any 
attation charge. 
EXISTING TENANT LEASES. If Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer not less than five (5) days prior to closing 
P3T of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affecting the property. Unless reasonable written objection is given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent prior 
tot*ng. Buyer shall take title subject to such leases. If the objections) is not remedied at or prior to dosing, this Agreement shall be null and void, j?v— 
CHANGES DURING TRANSACTION. During the pendency of this Agreement, Seller agrees that no changes in any existing leases shall be made, nor new leases 
wed into, nor shall any substantial alterations or improvements be made or undertaken without the written consent of the Buyer. 
DATE:. /r '' '' ' 
indersigned Buyer / — • ' / *-- -^*~ . •* '•/ / 'i--^{ C..KZL ?'?«-*/ 
NEST MONEY, the amount of. 
xm of. 
• ^ / A ' i ••>— 
haU be deposited in accordance .with applicable State Law. 
Received by. 
/ •T7 
hereby deposits with Brokerage 
ge PHone Number 
OFFER TO PURCHASE 




OPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MOf^ EY is given to secure and apply on the purchase of .the property situated at li 
•"'/;' ^ *- ' ^ « t-.'^> in the City of '' .^J^7 •'. ^.' <^:'' EZ County of -. 'J.S- ,' - ^ /—*- £."' r~f 
to any restrictive covenants, zoning regulations, utility or other easements or rights of way, government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer in 
nee with Section G. jSaid property is owned by ^ •• -'•> ; : . ^- '• - .* ' . as sellers, and is more particularly described 
,. / , * . . * - / i « j _ _ 
IK APPLICABLE BOXES: 
NIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY D Vacant Lot Dyacant Acreage D Other 
IPROVED REAL PROPERTY • Commercial ^Residential D Condo • Other 
Included items. Unless excluded below, this sale shall include all fixtures and any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property, 
following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to title: 
Excluded items. The following items are specifically excluded from this sale:. ffAJ&-
CONNECTIONS^ UTILITIES AND OTHER RIGHTS. Seller represents that the property includes the following improvements in the purchase price: 
jblic sewer 0 connected 
iptic tank D connected 
her sanitary system. 
iblic water connected 
ivate water D connected 
• well D connected • other 
G irrigation water / secondary system 
# of shares Company 
D TV antenna D master antenna D prewired 
0 natural gas 0 connected 
ET electricity ^connected 
D ingress & egress by orivate easement 
0 dedicated road 121 paved 
ED curb and gutter 
• other rights 
Survey. A certified survey L_ shall be furnished at the expense of 
3uyer Inspection. Buyer has made a visual inspection of the property 
jition, except: "'' *^<— r r * f •'-" ^v ^ " ^ 
.prior to closing, D shall not be furnished. 
and subject to Section 1 (c) above and 6 below, accepts it in its present physical 
(L 
*CHASEPpi(iE AND FINANCING. The total purchase price for the property is* £ * r f ^ . , 'lt/-;fj^/?4*A "J.'sr yWf\L'/{/*> / fi^JS^dJCK 
*- '/ffi/oo - —"* Dollars ($^2-<± *~ >^£> _) which shall be paid as follows: 
"f^'i • . / y which represents the aforedescribed EARNEST MONEY DEPOSIT: 
JIIIULJLO representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at closing. 
•^ representing the approximate balance of an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrance to be assumed by buyer, 
which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of S 
which include: • principal; • interest; • taxes; • insurance; • condo fees; D other 
( — representing the approximate balance of an additional existing mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to be 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum with monthly payments of $ 
which include: • principal; • interest; • taxes; D insurance; • condo fees; • other 
representing balance, if any, including proceeds from a new mortgage loan, or seller, financing, to be paid as follows: . ^ ,<> /^=v^ 
h r.rn 
Other. 
TOTAL PURCHASE PRICE 
r is required to assume an underlying obligation (in which case Section F shall also apply) and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts 
e and/or procure same and this offer is made subject to Buyer qualifying for and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing/Buyer agrees 
application within ^\ days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement to assume the underlying obligationand/or obtain the new financing at 
\\ rate not to exceed /C^' *>* **B u v e r d°es not qualify for the assumption and/or financing within - A C ^ days a f t e r Seller's acceptance 
ireement, this Agreement shall be voidable at the option of the Seller upon written notice. Seller agrees to pay up to ' — ' ' — mortgage loan discount 
tt to exceed $ - - . In addition, seller agrees to pay $ *— ^ — ' to be used for Buyer's other loan costs. 
<rTl C^:. :=-. 
ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes: ( ) a COUNTER OFFER ( l^an ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the _ Z _ ^ _ L day of A/P (/ igff / , between ±&&Jd-J±r' 
/;'ck\ tt>*£4i&eq
 buyer(s) and i^Ta^^^lX. assel(er(s), 
covering real property described as*iettows: — ^-.?*~ / .<r:^, ^ 
~^£<^A /^> *zz>^.',;)<=. ^Ufe. ^ > » ^ / ^^ - . &,iy. t-firr 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
*0 // Muss UTil^^/uk /-fJ ^ffi^Ut £>?! 
a? A^:^ -cp ~LISZA/AJ MSJ&&G. $&&#<4£ / ^ ^ e - • 
fJ fxtHcri/£^ *A.^<4>£K <J'rr*'i LQ^AX /?- / r "TO *IT*JLJL V- ^-P/* '*> ^ QP u i~ 
- p^\ " •—; ; 1 - -^y ~ ? H
 r , < 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. W Seller.jggTBuyer shall have until — " (A.M./P.M.) 
• ' / 19 .L, to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Date ; Signature, of ( ) Seller ( v^Buyer 
Time (A.M./P.M.) 
^.-•' s*y ^r^^j^<^\ '- ^r 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above. 
( ) I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum. 
Signature Signature Date Time 
( ) I hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
( ) I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures. 
Signature of Buyer(s) Date Signature of Seller(s) Date 
( ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on 
19 . by Certified Mail and return receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. 
Sent by 
,es and exceptions noted herein, evidenced by current policy of title insurance in the amount of purchase price D an abstract of title brought current. 
fs opinion (See Section H). 
ION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G, Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to dosing. Buyer shad take title 
! - "w e x j5 t jng restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer U has U has not reviewed any condominium CC & R's prior tpsjgning this Agreement. 
1NG OF TITLE. Title shall vest in Buyer as follows: ^ ' i ZJJ-*S/£ JT^7^> A-T^ / /AV/^ / / ^ sjr>/ls:^ /A/.\L 
^ELLERS WARRANTIES. In addition to warranties contained in Section C, the foliowingjtems are also warranted: ^f^U^rfZ /'V f'?\\/K 
ti the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offer is made subject to the following special conditions and/or contingencies which must be satisfied 
0 dosing L/' - — • • < ^ S—<z— JC- / r~ ^>f/'&<"& f^-c- «^>Y- •r-A/ 
L.'C- *'!.(-/ 'J*-r.*4- J-£ /ir/,) 'fA/Tir?*' • ! / > < < > V**-7ji*.*J.,ls 
• - - < " 
<-r/ <& * . - , 
^ 
a reasonable location to be designated by CLOSING OF SALE. This Agreement shall be closed on or before >*- / - A 1 - / 't': ,19.! 
, subject to Section Q. Upon demand, Buyer shall deposit with the escrow closing office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance with 
jreement. Prorations set forth in Section R shall be made as of • date of possession {pdate of closing • other 
POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer on £J>-! r K/ f.Z/^•fj.jxJp (Sunless extended by written agreement of parties. 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE. At the signing_of this Agreement the listing agent V/C- <^ / / . / r^ - /^» J-JL_ represents (^fSeller ( ) Buyer. 
e selling agent. - ^ '?*"£!S A / l ^ — * represents ( ) Seller (IS) Buyer. Buyer and Seller confirm that prior to signing this Agreement 
i disclosure of the agency relationships) was provided to him/her. t " ^p ) (- '/TBuyer's initials ( ) ( ) Seller's initials. 
SENERAL PROVISIONS. UNLESS OTHERWISE INDICATED ABOVE, THE GENERAL PROVISION SECTIONS ON THE REVERSE SIDE HEREOF HAVE BEEN 
AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME LIMIT FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller shall 
mtil s± 
X to the^BuyeC 





" "" £ 
.• —./ / - ' / 
(Date) -
Pate) 
H it ' i 
**• * / 
f -"^  . • ' r r 
(Address) 
(Address) 
~ O J-i'~l :- .'.' ~ Y-
(Phone) 
(Phone) 




JCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above. 
EJECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing offer (Seller's initials) 
)UNTER OFFER. Seller hereby ACCEPTS the foregoing offer SUBJECT TO the exceptions or modifications as specified below or in the attached Addendum, and 
ants said COUNTER OFFER for Buyer's acceptance. Buyer shall have until (AM/PM) , 19 to accept the terms 
ified below. 
s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Address) (Phone) (SSN/TAX ID) 
CONE: 
CEPTANCE OF COUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER 
JECTION. Buyer hereby REJECTS the COUNTER OFFER. (Buyer's Initials) 
HUNTER OFFER. Buyer hereby ACCEPTS the COUNTER OFFER with modifications on attached Addendum. 
s Signature) (Date) (Time) (Buyer's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
> Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Seller with copies of this Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the following alternatives must therefore be completed). 
J I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
.«<? ~>« SIGNATURE OF BUYER *?-••— iRE OF SELLER 
Date 
Oat* 
JI personally caused a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures to be mailed on. 
d Mail and return receipt attached hereto to th« D Seller • Buyer. Sent by 
hree Of m four omam f o r m 
.19. -by 
i r her authority to do sp and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO ORAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire agreement between the parties and supersedes and cancels any 
I afl poor negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no oral agreements which modify or affect this agree-
tt. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
L COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shall be in writing and. if attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this Agreement 
expressly modified or excluded therein. 
. DEFAULT/INTERPLEADER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer, Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated damages 
i institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of default by Seller, or it this sale fails to close because of the nonsatisfaction of any express condition 
ontingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit shall be returned to 
er. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all costs and expenses, 
jding a reasonable attorney's fee, which may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by ap-
ible law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest money deposit is required to file an in-
leader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller authorize the principal broker to draw from the 
test money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount of deposit remaining after advancing those costs shall 
iterpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting party shall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's 
incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made in this Agreement, execution and delivery of final closing documents shall abrogate this Agreement. 
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until closing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property between 
late hereof and the date of closing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God, and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed ten percent 
B) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may at his option either proceed with this transaction if Seller agrees in writing to repair or replace damaged property 
to dosing or declare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price and Seller agrees in writing to repair 
place and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
TIME IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE DELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be closed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport, strikes, 
lood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, delays caused by lender, acts of God, or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the closing 
shall be extended seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than fifteen (15) days beyond the closing date provided herein. Thereafter, 
is of the essence. This provision relates only to the extension of closing dates. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed and 
sred by all parties to the transaction. 
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow closing fee, unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs of providing 
nsurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by Seller. Taxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, rents, and interest 
isumed obligations shall be prorated as set forth in Section 8. Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mortgage or other reserves shall be assigned to Buyer 
>sing. 
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than those ex»-
d herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) special warranty deed, 
lining Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the said existing real 
i contract therein. 
NOTICE. Unless otherwise provided in this Agreement, any notice expressly required by it must be given no later than two days after the occurrence or non-occurrence 
( event with respect to which notice is required. If any such timely required notice is not given, the contingency with respect to which the notice was to be given 
omaticaily terminated and this Agreement is in full force and effect. If a person other than the Buyer or the Seller is designated to receive notice on behalf of the 
- or the Seller, notice to the person so designated shall be considered notice to the party designating that person for receipt of notice. 
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
DAYS. For the purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term, "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays. 
; FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. 
J FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL — JULY 1f 1987 
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MITCHEL T. RICE, No. 6022 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Spectrum Development Corporation 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 




and VICKI A. 
Plaintiffs, 
BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a 
Utah general partnership, 
CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, 
a Utah general partnership, 
as partner of Burningham S 
Kimball; VICTOR M. KIMBALL, 
individually and as general 
partner of Christensen & 
Kimball; SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT 
CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation, as partner of 




MEMORANDUM OF POINTS 
AND AUTHORITIES 
REGARDING IMPLIED WARRANTY 
OF HABITABILITY 
Civil No. 90-0906667CN 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT CORPOR-
ATION, a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR CONDI-
TIONING, a Utah corporation, 
and RANDY TIMOTHY PAINTING, 
INC., a Utah corporation, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
7VT">T»T?x"Tr>-r,\r 
Defendant Spectrum Development Corporation, by and through its 
attorney, Dennis R. James of Morgan & Hansen, and pursuant to 
invitation of the Court by Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, 
submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities 
addressing the applicability of Wade v. Jobe. 818 P.2d 1006 (Utah 
1991) to the case at hand. 
ARGUMENT 
A. There is not even the slightest hint in the language of Wade 
v. Jobe that the Court considered the warranty of habitability 
to be applicable in the real property area beyond residential 
leases. 
It would require a "quantum jump" to draw the presumption that 
the Utah Supreme Court, by adopting an implied warranty of 
habitability theory in landlord/tenant law, intended this theory of 
law to also be applied to the purchase of new homes from a 
builder/vendor. The Utah Supreme Court made it perfectly clear 
that they were adopting a theory applicable only to residential 
leases. By footnote, the Court indicated that it was not even 
extending the common law implied warranty of habitability to 
commercial leases, let alone making the even greater jump required 
to make the theory applicable to the purchase of new homes from a 
builder/vendor. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, page 1010, footnote 
2. There has been no suggestion that the 40 states that have 
adopted the warranty of habitability theory, either legislatively 
or judicially, in the area of landlord/tenant law, have seen fit to 
expand that theory into the realm of new home purchases. 
wp51\drj\4103f.mero 2 
B. Plaintiffs have not brought the appropriate case before this 
Court for consideration of expanding the implied warranty of 
habitability into the area of new home purchases. 
Even if there was some correlation between the states that 
have adopted the warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant 
area and the states that have adopted the warranty of habitability 
in the new construction area, Plaintiffs have simply not brought 
the appropriate case before this Court for the requested expansion 
of the law. While Plaintiffs espouse that, in spite of the lack of 
"cost-effectiveness" of their case, they are pursuing a worthy 
principle which transcends economic realities, our common law is 
still developed on a case by case approach. Even though one 
believes that a new legal theory is worthy of adoption in Utah, the 
courts must await a case with the right facts in order to consider 
such an expansion of the law. 
In Wade v. Jobe. the Utah Supreme Court was handed a most 
appropriate case for the adoption of the warranty of habitability 
theory in the area of landlord/tenant law. In that case, we have 
a single mother with three young children who, within a few days of 
taking occupancy, had no hot water. An investigation revealed that 
the lack of hot water was the result of the flame of the water 
heater having been extinguished by accumulated sewage and water in 
the basement, which produced a foul odor throughout the house. The 
landlord, upon being notified of the problem, pumped the sewage and 
water from the basement onto the sidewalk, never solving the 
problem. An inspection by the Ogden City Inspection Division 
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revealed that the premises were unsafe for human occupancy due to 
the lack of a sewer connection and other problems. The Division 
found numerous code violations which were a substantial hazard to 
the health and safety of the occupants. The Division issued a 
notice that the property would be condemned if the violations were 
not remedied. The landlord's treatment of his tenants was 
offensive to human sensitivities. After the tenant moved out of 
the house, the landlord had the gall to bring suit to recover the 
unpaid rent, thereby inviting the Court to find a legal theory to 
protect this defenseless tenant from the egregious behavior of this 
overreaching landlord calloused to human sensitivities and with no 
regard for the health or safety of this woman and her three 
children. 
Given those facts, the Court adopted an implied warranty of 
habitability theory with respect to residential leases based upon 
the following factors: 
1. The rule of caveat emptor assumes an equal bargaining 
position between landlord and tenant. Wade v. Jobe, 818 P.2d 1006, 
p. 1010. 
2. Modern tenants, like consumers of goods, however, 
frequently have no choice but to rely on the landlord to provide a 
habitable dwelling. Id. 
3. Where they exist, housing shortages, standardized leases 
and racial and class discrimination place today's tenants, as 
consumers of housing, in a poor position to bargain effectively for 
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express warranties and covenants, requiring landlord to lease and 
maintain safe and sanitary housing. Id. 
4, In consumer law, implied warranties are designed to 
protect ordinary consumers who do not have the knowledge, capacity, 
or opportunity to insure that goods which they are buying are in 
safe condition. Id. 
5. The implied warranty of habitability has been adopted in 
other jurisdictions to protect the tenant as the party in the less 
advantageous bargaining position. Id. 
Recognizing that these were the bases relied upon by the Court 
for the adoption of the theory of implied warranty of habitability 
in the landlord/tenant area of the law, we must first analyze 
whether the facts of our case warrant the Court's consideration of 
the expansion of that theory into the area of purchases of new 
homes. The answer is a resounding "no" based upon the following 
facts: 
1. The facts are clear that the Plaintiffs were in a strong 
bargaining position with respect to the purchase of this home. 
They bargained the price down from $260,000 to $235,000 and then 
bargained an additional $8,475 in credits. Plaintiffs were able to 
demand completion of an extremely detailed punch list of items by 
the Seller. Plaintiffs had many houses to choose from and there 
was no testimony that they were under any pressure to purchase this 
particular home. Plaintiffs were represented by a real estate 
agent with ten years' experience (who, in spite of contrary 
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assertions by counsel for Plaintiffs in his closing argument, 
clearly represented the Plaintiffs, as specifically indicated in 
Item 10, Agency Disclosure, of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
Exhibit 28) . Plaintiffs had Brent Toolson, who had both experience 
and education in the contracting industry, walk through and inspect 
the home. 
2. Instead of a situation in which buyers are left without 
warranty due to the common law merger doctrine upon closing and 
execution of the warranty deed, the Plaintiffs specifically 
negotiated a one-year builder's warranty on the entire home. By 
the very terms of Section 0 of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, 
this and any other express warranties survived the execution and 
delivery of final closing documents. 
The entire basis for the Utah Supreme Court's adoption of the 
implied warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant area is 
missing with respect to the case at hand. There was no evidence of 
a disparity of bargaining position unless it was disparity in favor 
of Plaintiffs who were taking advantage of an anxious seller. 
There was no evidence of housing shortages forcing Plaintiffs to 
either take this home or go without shelter. There was no evidence 
that any warranty proposed by Plaintiffs in their offer had been 
rejected or crossed out by Seller. There was no evidence that 
Plaintiffs were forced to use a standardized Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement in making their offer or that they were prevented, or 
even pressured, from completing it and the Addendum in accordance 
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with their own desires and in accordance with the advice of their 
real estate agent. There is simply no evidence that Plaintiffs 
were in a poor position to bargain effectively for express 
warranties and covenants. The detailed punch list requirements, 
the required $8,475 in credits, and the specific inclusion of the 
one-year builder's warranty are all facts running counter to the 
Utah Supreme Court's basis for their decision in Wade v. Jobe. 
C Plaintiffs* inclusion of an express one-year builder's 
warranty excluded the possibility of them benefitting, in 
addition, from an implied warranty covering the same subject 
matter. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes 
Corp. , 753 P.2d 964, 970 (Utah App. 1988) citing the earlier Utah 
Supreme Court ruling in Rio Alaom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 
497, 505 (Utah 1980) stated that "an express agreement or covenant 
relating to a specific contract right excludes the possibility of 
an implied covenant of a different or contradictory nature." The 
Court of Appeals, citing 3 Corbin on Contracts § 564 (1960) , 
further solidified this position by stating, "[w]here the parties 
have made an express contract, the court should not find a 
different one by 'implication1 concerning the same subject matter 
if the evidence does not justify [such] an interference ..." Ted 
R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp. at 970. 
Plaintiffs included an express one-year builders1 warranty in 
their offer, which was accepted by the Seller. They now are asking 
this Court to expand their warranty rights far beyond what they 
proposed and bargained for in their contract. The granting of such 
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a request would violate the very rule of law of this State set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Alaom Corp, v. Jimco Ltd, This is 
not an appropriate case to even consider expanding the implied 
warranty of habitability theory into the realm of sales of newly 
constructed homes. 
D. The tests adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe 
were not breached by the Defendants. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Wade v. Jobe stated, "As a general 
rule, the warranty of habitability requires that the landlord 
maintain 'bare living requirements1. . . and that the premises are 
fit for human occupation." Id. 1010-11. Plaintiffs, in the case 
at hand, were never forced to seek alternative shelter. They did 
eat out for a meal or two when they were without water because of 
the frozen pipes, but nothing more. There is no evidence that the 
home failed to meet the bare living requirements or that it was not 
fit for human occupation. It is noteworthy that the need for paint 
was specifically excluded by the Court as a requirement. 
The Court indicated that substantial compliance with building 
and housing code standards would generally serve as evidence of the 
fulfillment of the landlord's duty to provide habitable premises. 
Id, 1011. The evidence in the case at hand is that the construc-
tion met all code requirements and passed all inspections. There 
was not even a citation issued in connection with Salt Lake City's 
investigation of the frozen pipes. The Court did indicate that 
there could be a breach of the warranty even though there was no 
code violation if the claimed defect had an impact on the health or 
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safety of the tenant. Id. There is simply no evidence in the case 
at hand that the health or safety of the Plaintiffs was ever in 
question as a result of the alleged defects for which they seek 
reimbursement. 
Most importantly, the Court set forth the requirement that the 
landlord must have a reasonable time to repair material defects 
before a breach can be established. Id. 1010. This requirement 
alone, which, in all fairness would necessarily be a requirement if 
the warranty of habit ability were expanded to the purchase of new 
homes, would bar Plaintiffs1 recovery. Plaintiffs never provided 
the Defendants or the Third-Party Defendants any notice, demand, or 
opportunity to cure the alleged defects. 
E. The facts of this case do not warrant the Court's interference 
with the sanctity of the parties1 contract. 
Even with full deference to the Utah Supreme Court's adoption 
of the warranty of habitability in the landlord/tenant area in Wade 
v. Jobe, the courts of this State are duty bound to uphold the 
sanctity of the parties1 contract. The Utah Supreme Court 
reiterated the fundamental right of the parties to contract freely 
on terms which establish and allocate risks between them in 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch, 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 
by stating: 
With a few exceptions, it is still axiomatic in 
contract law that persons dealing at arm's length are 
entitled to contract on their own terms without the 
intervention of the courts for the purpose of relieving 
one side or the other from the effects of a bad bargain. 
Parties should be permitted to enter into contracts that 
actually may be unreasonable or which may lead to 
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hardship on one side. Although courts will not be 
parties to enforcing flagrantly unjust agreements, it is 
not for the courts to assume the paternalistic role of 
declaring that one who has freely bound himself need not 
perform because the bargain is not favorable. 
Id. at 1040 (citations omitted). 
The Court went on to discuss unconscionability as an exception 
to these general principles. However, we are not dealing in the 
case at hand with an unconscionable contract. Plaintiffs chose to 
use the standardized Earnest Money Sales Agreement as the vehicle 
to present their offer. Plaintiffs drafted the Addendum. 
Plaintiffs filled in the blank spaces of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement. Plaintiffs proposed the terms of sale. Plaintiffs 
required the one-year builder's warranty. 
There is no evidence of fraud or concealment of known defects. 
There is no evidence of a failure to disclose dangerous conditions. 
There is no gross disparity of bargaining positions requiring a 
reapportioning of responsibility in spite of the contract terms. 
F. Plaintiffs, with the exception of the one-year builders1 
warranty and the warranties set forth in Section C of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement (Ex. 28), expressly accepted the 
property "as is." 
Plaintiffs, by the terms of their own document, accepted the 
property in "as is" condition. The law of this state with respect 
to that provision is set forth in Tibbets v. Ooenshaw, 18 Utah 2d 
442, 425 P.2d 160 (1967), in which the court upheld a lower court 
ruling that an "as is" provision in a real estate contract was 
effective to disclaim any potential implied warranties. There, as 
here, the "as is" provision is controlling because the Plaintiffs 
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have failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that such was 
not the understanding of the parties at the time the contract was 
entered into, Id. at 161-62. A party cannot sign a contract and 
thereafter assert ignorance or failure to read the contract as a 
defense to its enforcement. John Call Engineering, Inc. v. Manti 
City Corp. , 743 P.2d 1205, appeal after remand 795 P.2d 678. 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 
706 P.2d 1028. 
Plaintiffs argue that not all of the preprinted terms of the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement apply to the case at hand. On this 
ground they seek the Court's help in relieving them of their 
agreement to accept the property in "as is" condition subject to 
Seller fs warranties as outlined in Section 6 of the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement. It is interesting to note that it was in Section 
6 that Plaintiffs added the requirement of a one-year builder's 
warranty. It seems obvious that Plaintiffs' real estate agent, 
knowing of the "as is" provision, saw the need to include an 
express one-year builder's warranty on the entire home. 
Plaintiffs' counsel, in his closing argument, specifically 
referenced Section C on page 1 of the Earnest Money Sales Agree-
ment, calling the Court's attention to the reference to air 
conditioning and asking whether the Seller wants to be bound to 
such a warranty in light of the fact that the home, as originally 
constructed, had no air conditioner. This matter was, of course, 
resolved at closing by Exhibit 79 in which the Plaintiffs specifi-
wp51\drj\4103f.mem 11 
cally agreed to undertake the installation of the air conditioner 
and to release Sellers in connection therewith. Parties to a 
contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or all of a contract 
and the terms of the modification prevail over inconsistent terms 
in the original contract. Ted R. Brown and Assoc, v. Carnes Corp., 
753 P.2d 964, 968 (Utah App. 1988). 
More importantly, the fact that a term or a phrase or even a 
section of a contract is inapplicable does not render unenforceable 
another section of the contract that is clear, unambiguous, and 
applicable. Common sense and good faith are the leading character-
istics of all constructions of contracts. Contracts must receive 
a reasonable construction according to the intention of the parties 
at the time of executing them, if that intention can be ascertained 
from their language. A reasonable construction will be preferred 
to one which is unreasonable, and that interpretation should be 
adopted which, under all the circumstances of the case, ascribes 
the most reasonable, probable, and natural conduct of the parties. 
17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts, §§ 340, 342, 344. 
It is fundamental that doubtful language in a contract should 
be interpreted most strongly against the party who has selected 
that language, especially where he seeks to use such language to 
defeat the contract or its operation, unless the use of such 
language is prescribed by law. Also, in case of doubt or ambigu-
ity, a contract will be construed most strongly against the party 
wp51\drj\4103f.mem 12 
whose attorney drew or prepared it. Id. § 348 (emphasis added) . 
Although the rule is well settled that written or typed 
provisions, when there is an inconsistency, are given greater 
effect than the printed parts, there is no suggestion by that rule 
that printed parts are not enforceable. Id. § 395. Printed parts 
are controlling absent such inconsistency with written or typed 
parts. 
SUMMARY 
Plaintiffs have not presented to this Court a case which cries 
out for the expansion of the implied warranty of habitability 
theory to new construction home sales at the expense of the 
sanctity of the contractual rights of the parties. This is not a 
"sewage in the basement" case. This is not a case in which the 
"big bad builder" forced unconscionable contractual terms on the 
"poor innocent purchaser" or refused to give express warranties 
with respect to the construction of the home. This is not a case 
in which the "big bad builder" chose to ignore the repeated demands 
of the "poor innocent purchaser." Plaintiffs1 first written demand 
was this lawsuit, commenced several years after the fact, with no 
opportunity for the contractor or any subcontractor to remedy or 
cure. 
This is not the case that screams for the Court to step into 
the legislative arena, no matter how strong the desire may be to 
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BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a Utah 
general partnership, et al., 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 9009066667 
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NEIL'S HEATING & AIR 
CONDITIONING, a Utah 
corporation, et al., 
Third-Party Defendants. 
Plaintiffs, by and through their attorneys and pursuant to 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) and the directions of this Court 
at a hearing held on July 31, 1992, hereby respectfully submit 
their proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW as to those 































1. Plaintiffs are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. The contract herein sued upon arose and was to be performed 
within said county and state. 
2. The Defendant CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, is a Utah general 
partnership with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. Defendant VICTOR M. KIMBALL is a resident 
of and is doing business within Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
The Defendant SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION is a Utah 
corporation with its principal place of business in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. 
3. Pursuant to an open court Stipulation entered into the 
record at the commencement of trial, the Defendants are jointly and 
severally liable for the damages found herein. 
4. On or about November 17, 1987, the Forsbergs, as buyers, 
and Defendant, CHRISTENSEN & KIMBALL, as sellers, entered into a 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement whereby the Forsbergs bought from the 
Defendants a home located at 2364 South Scenic Drive, Salt Lake 
City, Utah. Said home is more particularly described as Yard 105, 
Benchmark Subdivision. (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 28.) 
5. Said Earnest Money Sales Agreement contained, inter alia. 
the following express warranty and representation: 
"Seller to give a one-year builder's warranty on entire 
home.w 
(Exhibit 28, p. 6.) 
6. During the spring of 1988, after the Forsbergs moved into 
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home leaked and permitted substantial amounts of water to enter and 
flood said floor. 
7. During the spring of 1988, the paint on the railings and 
deck of the home flaked off and required substantial repair, 
including sanding, sealing and repainting. 
8. During the night of February 3, 1989, the water pipes 
within the home froze and burst causing severe water damage to the 
home and necessitating substantial repair. 
9. The interior of the home experienced substantial 
difficulty in maintaining adequate heat and air conditioning, 
ultimately requiring an additional furnace and air conditioning 
unit to be added to the home. 
YARD MISREPRESENTATION 
10. As part of the Defendants' efforts to sell the home, the 
Defendants' realtor prepared a document entitled "FACT SHEET" 
purporting to state relevant information about the home and yard 
size. According to said FACT SHEET, the yard size was M98' x 102/M 
and described as a "flat backyard with room for a pool." 
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 27.) 
11.. The Defendants also misrepresented the size of the yard 
by planting poplar trees as a site barrier between the subject home 
site and the GMAC building located to the west of the property. 
Said trees were beyond the actual property lines. (Plaintiffs' 
Exhibits 34, 35, 75-D.) 
12. The Forsbergs reasonably relied upon the representations 





























no notice whatsoever at the closing as to the size of the property 
of the location of easements restricting the utility of the yard. 
13. The property, as represented by the Defendants, would 
contain 9,996 sq. ft. The actual size of the property is 
approximately 4,628 sq. ft. The fair market value of the property, 
as indicated by the Defendants own testimony, is the sum of $3.85 
per sq. ft. and the Plaintiffs thereby incurred damages as a direct 
and proximate result of the Defendants' negligent misrepresentation 
in the sum of $21,767.90. 
1988 BASEMENT FLOODING 
(Express Warranty) 
14. The Court finds that the home was not built in a workman-
like manner sufficient to keep it water tight and as a result 
thereof, the home experienced flooding during the spring of 1988. 
Such defect is covered by the one-year builders warranty provided 
by the Defendants. 
15. There was no credible evidence that there was any soils 
testing prior to construction of the home, even though there is no 
evidence of the source of the water nor evidence of any building 
code violations. 
16. Plaintiffs are entitled to those damages which are 
reasonably required to repair and to put the home in the condition 
as it should have been at the time of possession. Those damages 
are reflected in Exhibits 71-73 and Exhibit 64, plus a total of 





























$10,591.21. Said sums were necessarily incurred and are 
reasonable. 
DEFECTIVE PAINTING OF DECKS AND RAILS 
(Express Warranty) 
17. The Court finds that the railing and decks were not 
painted in a workman-like manner. Said defect is covered by the 
one-year builders warranty provided by the Defendants. 
18. The cost to repair said defect is reflected in 
Plaintiffs' Exhibit 44 and is the sum of $3,049.00 which the Court 
finds reasonable and necessary. 
(FEBRUARY 3. 1989 - FROZEN PIPE-FLOOD) 
(Express Warranty) 
19. The Court finds that the house was not built in a 
workman-like manner as to its framing and insulation thereby 
causing or permitting the water pipes within the home to freeze and 
burst during a severe cold experienced during the night of February 
3, 1989. The Court finds, however, that said occurrence was beyond 
the express one-year warranty provided by the Defendants. 
20. The Court does find, however, that the Plaintiffs 
incurred damages as a result of said incident in the sum of 
$5,169.92 as indicated in Exhibits P-46; P-57-62; P-66-70 all of 
which were necessarily incurred and are reasonable. 
COLLATERAL SOURCE 
21. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs made a claim upon 
their home-owners insurance for the damages sustained as a result 




























said insurance the sum of $6,036.42 (which claim included 
additional items withdrawn as claims asserted herein.) As a result 
of receipt of said insurance proceeds, the Plaintiffs incurred no 
compensable damages as a result of the ruptured water pipes. 
MITIGATION 
22. The Plaintiffs are not barred from recovery by a failure 
to mitigate their damages by requesting that the Defendants, or 
Defendants' subcontractors return to the premises to do the 
necessary repair work. The Court finds that such a request would 
have been a meaningless act and the evidence indicates that such 
requests to Defendants brought no response. 
ESCROW 
$1,000 
23. The $1,000 to be held in escrow pursuant to the closing 
documents (but erroneously not held by the title company) was 
intended as "security", in effect, for the completion of the "punch 
list" items shown on Exhibit P-84. No line item amounts are 
provided as to each entry and Plaintiffs did not proffer evidence 
as to each uncompleted item, or the value thereof. Accordingly, 
the Court finds "no cause of action" as to the escrow claim. 
ADEQUATE HEATING AND AIR CONDITIONING 
(Express Warranty) 
24. Pursuant to the closing documents, the Defendants were 
responsible for providing the home with an adequate heating system. 
In that regard, the Defendants failed to install or select 





























that issue, the Court discredits the testimony of Steve Sundloff 
and Bill Thompson and credits the testimony of Mr. Norton. 
25. On this issue, the court finds that the Plaintiffs have 
failed in their burden of proof. 
26. with respect to the air conditioning, the Court finds 
that, in accordance with the closing documents, said obligation 
remained with the Plaintiffs as evidenced by Exhibits P-79 & P-74, 
and the Defendants are not liable on that issue under any theory. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has subject matter and personal jurisdiction in 
this case. 
2. Pursuant to Stipulation, the Defendants are jointly and 
severally liable for the damages sustained by the Plaintiffs and 
for the Judgment to be issued pursuant to these Findings and 
Conclusions. 
YARD MISREPRESENTATION 
3. Utah has adopted the Restatement of Tort 2d §552 
regarding negligent misrepresentation and Restatement of Torts 2d 
§538a. A vendor is liable in tort for misrepresentations as to the 
area of land conveyed, notwithstanding such misrepresentations were 
made without actual knowledge of their falsity. The reason is that 
parties to a real estate transaction do not deal on equal terms. 
An owner is presumed to know the boundaries of his own land and the 
quantity of his acreage. If he does not know the correct 
information, he must find out or refrain from making 
representations to unsuspecting strangers. Even honesty in making 
Ilia mistake is no defense as it is incumbent upon the vendor to know 
2 the facts. (Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1249 (Utah 1980)) 
3|| 4. The parol evidence rule does not bar evidence of 
411 negligent misrepresentation. (Formento v. Encanto Business Park, 
5 744 P.2d 22 (Arizona 1987)) 
6 5. The integration clause of the Earnest Money Agreement is 
7 not applicable in an action based upon negligent misrepresentation. 
8 6. Plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the Defendants 
9 based upon the theory of negligent misrepresentation in the amount 
10 of $21,769.90. 
11 ONE-YEAR BUILDERS 
12 (Express Warranty) 
13 7. The flooding which occurred in the spring of 1988 was a 
14 breach of the one-year builders warranty provided by the 
15 Defendants. 
16 8. As a result of said breach, the Plaintiffs are entitled 
17 to a judgment against the Defendants in the sum of $10,591.21. 
18 9. The peeling paint on the exterior rails and decks which 
19 occurred in the spring of 1988 was a breach of the one-year 
20 builders warranty provided by the Defendants. 
21 10. As a result of said breach, the Plaintiffs are entitled 
22 to a judgment against the Defendants in the sum of $3,059.00. 
23 11. The ruptured water pipes which occurred on February 4, 
24 1989 was an incident beyond the one-year warranty and, therefore, 
































IMPLIED WARRANTY OF HABITABILITY 
12. The Court finds and adopts the principal that in Utah 
there exists an implied warranty of habitability in favor of buyers 
of new homes. A purchase of a home is the most significant single 
purchase in most individuals' lives and no adequate tort claim 
otherwise exists which would protect said buyers from latent 
defects existing within the home. 
13. Said warranty is limited to "latent1' defects. 
14. Said warranty is further limited to the concept of 
•'habitability" and is not applicable to the concept of 
"merchantability" or "adequate workmanship." 
15. Because the warranty of habitability is a creature of 
public policy, it generally cannot be waived, such waivers 
themselves being against public policy. In order for a warranty to 
exist their must be a conspicuous reference to the warranty within 
the contract, consciously understood and agreed to by the parties. 
16. In this particular case, the "one-year builders warranty" 
created an express warranty which waived any claim of implied 
warranty. 
IMPLIED WARRANTY 
17. As to the flooding within the home in the Spring of 1988, 
the Court finds that said flooding was the result of the 
Defendants' failure to build the home in a workman-like manner, 
causing a latent defect in the home. 






























19. As to the frozen and ruptured water pipes in February, 
1989, the Court finds that said damage occurred as a result of the 
Defendants' failure to build the home in a workman-like manner, 
causing a latent defect in the home. 
20. The broken water pipes did not, however, render the home 
"uninhabitable." 
21. The paint flaking and peeling off the exterior rails and 
deck was the result of the Defendants' failure to build the home in 
a workman-like manner, causing a latent defect in the home. 
22. The peeling paint did not, however, render the home 
"uninhabitable." 
DATED this day of October, 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
Honorable Michael R. Murphy 






























CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE 
WITH CJA 4-504(2) 
Plaintiffs certify that a copy of the Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed to counsel for 
the Defendants listed below more than five (5) days prior to 
submission to the Court in accordance with CJA 4-504(2). 
Dennis R. James, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendant Spectrum 
Development Corporation 
Morgan & Hansen 
136 South Main, #800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Duane Smith, Esq. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Christensen & Kimball, and 
Victor M. Kimball 
Dart, Adamson & Kasting 
310 South Main, #1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harold A, Hintze 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
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Attorney for Defendant Spectrum Development 
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NEIL'S HEATING & AIR ] 
CONDITIONING, a Utah ] 
corporation, et al., 
Third-party 
Defendants. ] 
1 DEFENDANT SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT' S 
I OBJECTIONS TO PLAINTIFFS' 
I PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
i CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
i Civil NO. 9009066667 
i Judge Michael R. Murphy 
Defendant Spectrum Development, by and through its 
attorney Dennis R. James of Morgan & Hansen, hereby objects to 
APPENDIX R 
Plaintiffs1 Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as set 
forth below: 
1. With respect to Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs » Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs' set forth what amounts to a 
conclusion of law that was never found by the Court and is 
completely contrary to any legal authority. There was no finding 
of fact or conclusion of law by the Court that the statement in the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Section 6, "Seller to give a one-
year builder's warranty on entire home," constituted an express 
warranty or representation. On its face, this statement simply 
indicates that at some point in time in the future, presumably at 
closing, seller would give to buyer some format of a one year 
builder's warranty. The language is not otherwise operative. 
In Groen v. Tri-O-Inc. , 667 P.2d 598 (Utah 1983) at p. 604 
(emphasis added), the Utah Supreme Court defined an express 
warranty as follows: 
"A warranty is an assurance by one party to a 
contract of the existence of a fact upon which 
the other party may rely. It is intended to 
relieve the promisee of any duty to ascertain 
the fact for himself and it amounts to a 
promise to answer in damages for any injury 
proximately caused if the fact warranted 
proves untrue." 
With respect to the statement "Seller to give a one-year 
builder's warranty on entire home", there is simply no statement or 
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assurance of the existence of a fact. it is a prospective 
statement without any specifics as to what might be warranted or 
what standard might be applied. What Plaintiffs now want the Court 
to do is to rewrite the agreement so that seller expressly warrants 
the entire home to be constructed in a workmanlike manner. 
Plaintiffs only possible cause of action with respect to 
the statement "Seller to give a one-year builder's warranty on an 
entire home" would be a breach of contract claim for failing to 
provide the warranty Plaintiffs expected would be provided at 
closing. There was simply no allegation of such a breach and no 
evidence presented with respect thereto. 
In Garriffa v. Taylor, 675 P.2d 1284 (Wyo. 1984), the 
Wyoming Supreme Court clearly set forth the law that for an express 
warranty to arise, there must be more than a general statement that 
seller is to provide a warranty. At Page 1286 of its opinion, the 
Court stated as follows: 
"In order for an express warranty to exist, 
there must be some positive and unequivocal 
statement concerning the thing sold which is 
relied upon by the buyer and which is 
understood to be an assertion concerning the 
item sold and not an opinion." 
The only express warranty provided by the Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement is found in the pre-printed provisions on Page 1 of 
the Agreement under Section C, Seller Warranties. In that section, 
3 
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seller warrants, inter alia that, "the plumbing, heating, air 
conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system and 
appliances shall be sound or in satisfactory working condition at 
closing-" That is the extent of the express warranties with 
respect to the construction of the home. Otherwise, pursuant to 
Section B of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Plaintiffs accepted 
the property in "as is" condition-
In order for Plaintiffs to recover under an express 
warranty theory, they would have to present to the Court express 
warranty language to the effect that seller was warranting against 
any flooding of the home or was warranting against paint flaking 
off the railings and decks on the exterior of the home or was 
warranting against the pipes freezing and breaking in severe cold. 
There is simply no evidence that such warranties were ever made a 
part of the agreement between the parties. 
At the hearing of July 31, 1992, wherein the Court set 
forth its skeletal decision with respect to this matter, there was 
absolutely no indication by the Court that any judgment was being 
granted under an express warranty theory. Recovery under such a 
theory was not even argued in Plaintiffs1 closing argument. The 
Court on Page 9 of the Transcript of the hearing (a copy of which 
is attached hereto as Exhibit "A") (hereinafter referred to as the 
"Transcript"), in rendering its opinion that the defects found to 
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exist did not render the home uninhabitable, stated that with 
respect to such items, the parties can bargain for express 
warranties (Transcript, Page 7, lines 5 and 6). Even though the 
evidence indicated the superior bargaining position of buyers with 
respect to the purchase of the home, there was never any demand for 
an express warranty regarding flooding, exterior paint or bursting 
of pipes in severe cold spells. 
The Court, on Page 10 of the Transcript, found that 
Plaintiffs waived any claim of workmanship warranty, (Transcript, 
Page 10, lines 10-12). The waiver is found in Section B of the 
General Provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement, Page 1, 
which provides as follows: 
B. Inspection. Unless otherwise indicated, 
Buyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said 
property upon Buyer's own examination and 
judgment and not by reason of any 
representation made to Buyer by Seller or the 
Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its 
condition, size, location, present value, 
future value, income herefrom or as to its 
production, buyer accepts the property in "as 
is" condition subject to Seller's warranties 
as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer 
desires any additional inspection, said 
inspection shall be allowed by Seller but 
arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
The suggestion by Plaintiffs that they were awarded 
damages under an express warranty theory is exactly opposite to the 
Court's findings, conclusions and holding in this case. The Court 
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specifically indicated on Page 20 of the Transcript that the only 
reason the Court made the findings with respect to workmanship were 
in the event the Court was reversed by the Court of Appeals saying 
that the implied warranty of habitability was much more extensive 
than this Court determined it to be (Transcript, Page 20, lines 7-
10) • 
There was simply no express assurance as to condition, 
performance or physical quality and there was no express assurance 
against defective work. Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact should be stricken. 
2. With respect to Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, the "Spring of 1988" is a misstatement of the 
time that the Forsbergs moved into the subject home. Testimony was 
that it was around Memorial Day which would put the move-in time at 
the end of May, and beginning of June, 1988. Defendant Spectrum 
Development also objects to the phraseology, "the home leaked and 
permitted substantial amounts of water to enter and to flood said 
floor." A more accurate statement in light of testimony would be 
as follows: 
6. In May or June, 1988, water was 
discovered flowing onto and across the 
basement floor of the subject home. 
3. With respect to Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs1 testimony with respect to the flaking 
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paint was that there was some flaking in the spring or summer of 
1988. The only testimony regarding the repair required at that 
time was by Randy Timothy who indicated that it would have cost him 
approximately $200 in order to repair the flaking paint had a 
request been made that it be repaired in a timely manner. 
Therefore, a more accurate factual statement would be as follows 
with respect to Paragraph 7: 
7. During the Spring of 1988, Plaintiffs 
noticed some flaking of the paint on the 
railings and deck of the home. 
4. With respect to Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, the phrase "causing severe water damage to the 
home" is an over-statement well beyond the testimony. There was 
not severe water damage to the home, but instead water damage in 
two bathroom areas of the home. A more accurate statement with 
respect to Paragraph 8 would be as follows: 
8. During the night of February 3, 1989, 
certain water pipes within the home froze and 
burst causing water damage to two bathroom 
areas of the home necessitating $5,169.92 
worth of repair work. 
5. With respect to Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Facts, there is no indication in the Transcript even 
hinting at such a finding and Defendant objects to its inclusion as 
being unnecessary and a misstatement of actual findings. The Court 
stated on Page 6 of the Transcript, " . . . I cannot find by a 
PLEADINGS\SPECTRUH.OBJ 7 
preponderance of the evidence that there was a failure to install 
or select properly in a workmanlike fashion an adequate heating 
plant." (Transcript, Page 6, lines 13-15). This is the finding of 
fact that should be set forth. 
6. With respect to Paragraph 14 of Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Defendant Spectrum Development reiterates it 
objections as set forth in Paragraphs 1 and 2 above. Testimony 
placed the discovery of the flooding in May or June of 1988 and 
there was absolutely no finding by the Court that a failure to keep 
the home water tight was covered by an express warranty. The 
Court fs ruling was the opposite as set forth on Page 10 of the 
Transcript, where the Court ruled as follows, "There was, however, 
in this particular case, a waiver in the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement as to any claim of workmanship warranty." (Transcript, 
Page 10, lines 10-12.) 
7. With respect to Paragraph 16, this paragraph is 
unnecessary to the main body of the Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law in that it was a supplementary finding only for 
the purpose of preventing a retrial if the case is sent back down 
by the Appeals Court due to adoption by them of a broader scope of 
the implied warranty of habitability. The statement "Plaintiffs 
are entitled to those damages which are reasonably required to 
repair and put the home in the condition as it should have been at 
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the time of possession" is completely contrary to the Court's 
decision which was not to award damages in light of the fact that 
such flooding did not render the home uninhabitable, 
8. With respect to Paragraph 17 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, the Court never found that the painting 
deficiency was covered by an express warranty. The Court's ruling 
was the opposite. See Paragraph 6 above and Transcript, Page 10, 
lines 10-12. 
9. With respect to Paragraph 18 of Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, there was absolutely no finding by the Court that 
the cost to repair the defective painting was $3,049. The only 
testimony on the matter was that of Randy Timothy indicating that 
he could have repaired the flaking paint for approximately $200. 
There was no testimony from the individual who, three years 
thereafter, did the painting for $3,049. There was no testimony 
that such costs were reasonable or necessary or that they in any 
way related to or were a result of the initial flaking problem. 
10. With respect to Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, the Court simply found that a lack of workmanlike 
construction caused the pipes to burst and, but for the insurance, 
the Plaintiffs would have suffered damages as reflected in Exhibits 
P-46 - P-52, 57 - 62 and 66-70, totaling $5,169.92, all of which 
were reasonable in amount. (Transcript, Page 5, lines 19-23). 
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There was no finding of the Court with respect to an express 
warranty since there was no express warranty given against pipes 
freezing and bursting during severe cold periods. See Paragraphs 
1 and 6 above and Page 10 of the Transcript. 
11. With respect to Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs1 Proposed 
Findings of Fact, Plaintiffs' have here attempted to broaden the 
mitigation findings beyond the scope of the Court's ruling. The 
Court found specifically that there was no failure on the part of 
Plaintiffs to mitigate with respect to the flooding or with respect 
to the pipes freezing and breaking. See Transcript, Page 5, lines 
9-14 and Page 6, lines 2, 3. The Court did not address the issue 
of mitigation nor find it necessary to do so with respect to the 
painting. The only testimony on point with respect to the painting 
was that Plaintiffs never asked Randy Timothy to come back and 
repair the flaking paint and that Randy Timothy was willing to come 
back and repair the flaking paint had he been asked. Randy Timothy 
was in the Plaintiffs' home after they moved in doing other work 
for them, but they never asked him to repair the flaking paint on 
the decks and handrails. 
12. With respect to Paragraph 24 of Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Findings of Fact, there was no finding by the Court that Defendants 
failed to install or select properly in a workmanlike fashion an 
adequate heating system. The Court found just the opposite. The 
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Court indicated that there was no evidence of any code violation• 
The Court discredited the testimony of Sundloff and Thompson and 
credited the testimony of Norton. Norton's testimony was that the 
heating system installed by Neal• s Heating and Air Conditioning was 
more than adequate to meet the purpose intended. The Court found 
that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof in showing 
that Defendants failed to install or select properly in a 
workmanlike fashion an adequate heating plant. Transcript, Page 6, 
lines 4-20. 
13. With respect to Paragraphs 7, 8, 9 and 10 of 
Plaintiffs1 Proposed Conclusions of Law (Page 8), there was no 
finding by the Court of any express warranty against flooding or 
against peeling paint or against frozen water pipes. Defendant 
reiterates the arguments set forth in Paragraph 1 above. 
14. With respect to Paragraph 16 of Plaintiffs' Proposed 
Conclusions of Law (Page 9) , the Court did not rule that implied 
warranties were waived by express warranties. Rather, the Court 
found a particular waiver in the Earnest Money Agreement as to any 
claim of workmanship warranty. The waiver is set forth in Section 
B of the General Provisions of the Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
which provides in part as follows: 
"Buyer accepts the property in 'as is1 
condition . . . " 
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The Court simply found that Plaintiffs were subject to 
the "as is" provision of Section B which is an express waiver of 
any workmanship warranties. 
15. With respect to Paragraphs 21 and 22 of Plaintiffs1 
Proposed Conclusions of Law (Page 10), there was absolutely no 
finding that the flaking paint was a latent defect in the home. 
The paint problems were addressed in the exhaustive punch list 
created by Plaintiff Farrell Forsberg in anticipation of the 
closing. The only finding of the Court was set forth on Page 7 of 
the Transcript where the Court stated, "With respect to the 
painting, I find that it was not done in a workmanlike fashion. 
The failings, however, do not render the edifice uninhabitable." 
Transcript, Page 7, lines 2-5. 
In order to more accurately set forth the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, Defendant is submitting concurrently 
herewith its Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
DATED this 2*J day of September, 1992. 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
/~)- -- *Jj...» 
DerHTis R. James /*/ v 
Attorney for Defgnaant Spectrum 
Development 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 2*-f day of September, 1992, 
I caused a true and correct copy of DEFENDANT SPECTRUM 
DEVELOPMENT'S OBJECTION TO PLAINTIFFS* PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
to the following: 
Duane R. Smith 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
310 South Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
Harold A. Hintze 
GARDINER & HINTZE 
525 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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Third Judicial District 
By. 
NOV 2 * 1992 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL, a Utah 
general partnership, et al., 
Defendants. 
SPECTRUM DEVELOPMENT CORPORA-
TION, a Utah corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
NEIL'S HEATING & AIR 
CONDITIONING, a Utah corporation, 
et al., 
Third Party Defendants. 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CIVIL NO. 900906667 
Defendants' objections concerning plaintiffs' recovery 
under the builder's warranty provision is sustained. 
Dated this zf day of November, 1992. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPENDIX 6 
FORSBERG V. BURNINGHAM & KIMBALL PAGE TWO MINUTE ENTRY 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Minute Entry, to the following, this zr 
day of November, 1992: 
Duane R. Smith, Esq. 
310 S. Main, Suite 1330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Harold A. Hintze, Esq. 
525 East 100 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Dennis R. James, Esq. 
136 S. Main, 8th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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